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Reds Fire 6 Missiles Of Intercontinental Range Over Siberia

By Marquis Childs

As has been established beyond doubt by a top committee of technical intelligence experts, Soviet Russia fired an intercontinental ballistic missile at least six weeks ago and not immediately prior to the announcement that came with dramatic suddenness earlier this week.

The Technical Intelligence Review Committee has established that the Soviets successfully fired not one, but six long-range missiles. The series of test firings are believed to have occurred over a period of several weeks beginning perhaps two months ago.

The test shots were fired on a range of 4500 to 5000 miles in length, established in Northern Russia and Siberia. Establishment of this range followed successful tests more than a year ago of intermediate missiles on a shorter test range. The intermediate missiles are now reported to be in full production.

A small group in the Pentagon, the State Department and the intelligence services have known

for a month or more of the success of the Soviet ICBM. The distance the missile traveled was between 4000 and 4500 miles.

As long ago as July 10 the first intimation of Soviet success with the ICBM was contained in a report by Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Phillips, U. S. A. (ret.), military analyst of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Phillips said he obtained his information about the successful firing of a Soviet ICBM from foreign intelligence sources. He reported that in 10 separate tests the ICBM had been successfully fired.

Other Reports Received

Later there were other reports of the Soviet achievement. Several members of the Senate Armed Services Committee asked the Department of Defense whether these reports were true. They were told in each instance that there was no substance to the reports. It is possible, of course, that at that time there had not been the positive verification which was later obtained. Both intelligence and technical means were used to verify the test firings.

No advance announcement was made here as is done when the Atomic Energy Commission learns of a Soviet nuclear explosion, because intelligence officials wanted to wait and see what use the Soviet Union would make of this achievement. They were interested in seeing in what political context Moscow would put the news.

There is little doubt that it was carefully timed to coincide with Soviet delegate Valerian A. Zorin's blast in the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee in London rejecting the American package deal aimed at preventing a surprise attack.

The whole tone of the announcement, as reviewed by the highest intelligence authorities, was intended to convey the impression to the world that the Soviet Union was so powerful and so advanced in weapons development that the American proposal could be spurned.

The intelligence data on the ICBM firing in Siberia shows that it was a multi-stage missile. This is the reason why concern over the Soviet achievement was not too great.

A multi-stage missile has only a limited potential accuracy in its effect, a quick

weapon which American missile-makers felt they could also have perfected in a relatively short time if they had wanted to sidetrack their efforts to get a single-stage missile.

Inter-Service Rivalry

But at least two other reasons, which get into the troubled area of inter-service rivalry, help to explain why there has been no undue dismay in Washington at the Moscow announcement.

One is the fact that progress on the anti-missile has been much greater than anyone has yet suggested publicly. According to an authoritative source, the United States is, by conservative estimate, three years and perhaps four years ahead of the Soviet Union in development of the fantastically complicated defensive weapon.

The Army is developing the anti-missile, just as the Army also had, until a recent stop order from Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, pushed further than any other service the intermediate 1200-mile surface-to-surface missile. This is the Army's Jupiter, developed at the Redstone Arsenal in Alabama and the object of intense service rivalry.

With the bases available to the United States in Europe and the Middle East, the Jupiter, its proponents say, is more than the equivalent of the 5000-mile missile.

It has these pronounced advantages.

It can carry a much larger

equivalent of millions of tons of TNT) rather than the kiloton (thousands of tons, range.

It can be fired from a small and readily-concealed launching site whereas the ICBM takes a huge launching apparatus and, in its present phase of development, the equivalent of a small city of technicians. To conceal it from enemy intelligence is, therefore, almost impossible.

It is much more accurate. And the proponents add what they believe is the clincher: The Jupiter has been successfully test-fired. In contrast, the Air Force's longer range Thor has repeatedly gone pffft in tests at the base at Cocoa Beach, Fla.

Here, of course, one comes up against powerful forces, since facilities costing several millions of dollars have been installed by a private aircraft company to make the Thor while the Jupiter has been the product of a technical staff assembled by the Army.

For the moment, at least, America can count real advantage in the missile race. It would be a tragedy if they lost in the fierce competitive scramble of the services under the economy ceiling.

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Cold War: New Chapter

Plainly the Soviet Union has decided upon a speedup of the cold war, and the most sinister aspect is in the attempt to isolate the United States from its free world friends and allies. The timing of the announcement of the Russian intercontinental missile (which the United States Government had known about for perhaps two months), the virtual turndown almost immediately afterward of the Western plan on disarmament, the Russian machinations in Syria, the stiffened attitude against concessions in the satellites—all of these factors point to the same conclusion.

It is a plausible inference that Mr. Khrushchev has been experiencing so much trouble in consolidating his power at home that he must make a show of strength abroad. The harder Soviet line thus can be a combination of diversion from internal difficulties and appeasement of the more rigid factions, notably the army, that hold a mortgage on Mr. Khrushchev. Perhaps the change also stems from a psychological compulsion to assert Soviet equality or superiority. Many visitors to Moscow report that the Russians suffer from an almost morbid fear that they may be considered weak or backward. The Soviet muscle-flexing with the ICBM may in part be a sort of offset to the occasional unfortunate braggadocio by American military men about how Russia could be pulverized by weapons from this country or overseas bases.

The Western position at the arms-control talks in London probably had little or nothing to do with this change. The Soviet delegate, Mr. Zorin, has accused the West and particularly the United States of trying to make propaganda out of the talks—which is precisely what the Soviet Union has been doing. Seemingly the Russians have concluded that there is almost no chance of agreement at London even on suspension of nuclear weapons tests, and hence they are not even listening to Western proposals. Modifications in these proposals have come late, but they have gone a long way toward meeting Soviet objections. The Russians, however, evidently expect at least a temporary breakdown. They may, indeed, have intended their ICBM announcement to improve their bargaining position at future meetings.

None of this is an indication that Russia is bent on war. On the contrary, Mr. Khrushchev and Marshal Zhukov appear to have comprehended

the awful possibility of mutual nuclear annihilation. What they seem to have decided is that for the moment there would be no gain in accommodation with the West. They have set out vigorously to take advantage of Western weaknesses and to pursue their objectives through intimidation, indirect aggression and other means short of all-out war.

This sort of wedge-driving always holds a danger for the West, and no doubt Russia hopes that her possession of the ICBM will sap the confidence of other countries in alliances with the United States. On this point there is some ground for satisfaction in the progress of missile defense and the availability of intermediate-range missiles.

As Marquis Childs relates today, the United States has learned of not one but six Soviet long-range missile tests. Whether or not this information should have been made public earlier, the fact that it was obtained is significant. It testifies to the prowess of American intelligence, and it may well indicate further that the United States has perfected long-range radar that can detect the re-entry of ballistic missiles into the earth's atmosphere. This, in company with the work on the anta-missile missile, is very hopeful.

What must be avoided in the new stage of the cold war is any tendency toward isolationism in the American response. It is of course essential to produce an American intercontinental missile as soon as possible as part of the over-all military deterrent. But the ICBM is essentially an isolationist weapon, and it ought not to be emphasized to the detriment of other missiles and rounded military capability. One immediate counter to the Soviet ICBM, for example, is the ability to fire intermediate-range missiles from the overseas bases which Russia condemns so loudly. There are two lessons here. One is that this country's alliances have become more, not less important. The other is that the confusion over service prerogatives in intermediate-range missile development and production ought to be ended forthwith.

The new Soviet cold war tactic will succeed only if we and our allies fail to move together. What is imperative is recognition that the Soviet Union is employing a combination of military, political and economic techniques all over the world to achieve its ends. The West requires no less an integration of its own strategy, and wise use of economic and political power is just as necessary an element as additions to military power.

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Reds Zoom Ahead In Missile Race

By Stewart Alsop

IS THE SOVIET model of an intercontinental ballistic missile truly operational? That is, is it a weapon capable of being used in war, rather than a mere prototype? And if it is operational, is it sufficiently advanced for the Soviets to freeze on the model, as is their invariable custom when they are satisfied with a weapon, and proceed to mass-produce it?



Behind the bland mask of complacency which the Eisenhower Administration has assumed for public purposes, these are the key questions which the Government's intelligence experts and policy makers are anxiously asking. They are quite genuinely life-and-death questions. They cannot be answered with assurance. Yet they tell a lot about the real meaning of the latest Soviet ICBM test.

For the first thing to understand about the Soviet test is that it was not something new or unexpected.

The American Government has been aware of Soviet progress throughout, though the Administration has chosen to conceal it from the American people. The details of how the Government has known are of course properly secret. But certain obvious facts are public property—that radar is a line-of-sight instrument of theoretically unlimited range; and that ballistic missiles reach an altitude of hundreds of miles at the highest point in their trajectory, and are thus subject to radar detection at great range.

THE SOVIETS' first prototype test of their ICBM was roughly comparable to the Air Force test of the American Atlas ICBM in April, with the difference that the Atlas test failed while the Soviet test succeeded. As this reporter pointed out in reporting the Soviet test: "There is a long, difficult road to travel between the first test firing of a prototype missile and the achievement of an operational weapons system."

How far have the Soviets now traveled along that road? Part of the answer, at least, is suggested by a comparison between the Soviet claims for their ICBM model and the known characteristics of Atlas, which is at the present stage in no sense a weapon for use in war, but a research test vehicle.

The Soviets claim their model is a "multi-stage ballistic rocket," whereas the Atlas model unsuccessfully fired last spring consisted only of the huge initial-stage rocket. The Soviet model is "intercontinental," and the "results obtained show that it is possible to direct rockets to any part of the world." The Atlas model fired last spring was designed to fly only about 3000 miles. Finally, "the rocket landed in the target area," whereas the Atlas test prototype was not expected or designed to achieve any degree of accuracy.

The Soviet claims for their model are certainly vague, and designedly so. But in the past, Soviet claims have tended actually to understate Soviet achievements in the air-atomic field. Some experts, noting this fact, believe on the basis of the Soviet claims and other evidence that the Soviets already have an operational weapon ready for mass production.

Others believe, or hope, that more tests must be made, and more time must elapse, before the Soviets can get into quantity production.

"I HAD THOUGHT they were about a year ahead of us," one expert has remarked, "but now it looks more like two years." Despite the official complacency, it is well to understand what it could mean if this estimate is correct. For suppose the Soviets achieve a fully operational ICBM system two years before this country achieves a comparable system.

They will then be able to threaten, not only American cities, but the system of Strategic Air Force bases, whose location is well known, with instant destruction. They could thus threaten to weaken decisively, or even eliminate entirely, the American retaliatory power which is the only real shield of the free world. No one can predict whether in such circumstances the Soviets might actually launch a surprise attack. But it is not hard to predict that the Soviets would take every advantage of the obvious opportunity to blackmail the United States into accepting a super-Munich.

In these circumstances, it is simply incomprehensible that the Eisenhower Administration has chosen to tell the American people not to worry, and that everything is going to be all right.

Missile Plan Cutback Is Charged by Jackson

By John G. Norris
Staff Reporter

Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) said yesterday there has been a cutback in the planned monthly production of both the intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missiles, due to Administration "money limitations."

He backed up his flat assertion with details after a four-hour closed-door questioning of top Pentagon officials on Capitol Hill.

Two days ago, Jackson charged on the Senate floor that there had been a "slow down" in the United States ballistic missile program, in the face of the Russian claim that it had successfully tested an ICBM. Sen. Leverett Saltonstall (R-Mass.) ranking GOP member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, disagreed, declaring that he was informed that the vital program had not been cut.

Acting Defense Secretary Donald A. Quarles declined comment at the time. Yesterday he was called before the Military Applications Subcommittee of the Joint Atomic Committee, with nearly a score of Pentagon missile experts.

Emerging from the session, Quarles, made this statement to reporters:

"I can say that the missile programs have come under scrutiny along with all other programs as result of the budget review, but in handling them we have observed the top priority of the long range ballistic missiles."

"Subject to further study, we have not allowed funds to injure the program to the best of our knowledge, subject to further reconsideration."

Jackson said the Subcommittee which he heads was informed that the target date for availability of the ICBM and IRBM has had to be postponed due to unavoidable technical delays in the test program of the Atlas and Thor.

But at the same time, the Defense Department has "cut back" the production schedules of both missiles, which will mean that fewer of them will be available in operational units when the tests are complete and actual production starts, Jackson said. While the Pentagon contends that there has been no cut in funds for the projects, he said "it is clear" that more of them "could be ready sooner by spending more money."

Furthermore, Jackson said that early this month the Defense Department issued a directive restricting overtime for workers in the development of the Army's Jupiter IRBM.

Also, he said, Navy officials testified that their Polaris IRBM—still in the research stage—has been delayed by "budget limitations." This will delay the weapon, though not a great deal, he stated.

Jackson indicated that the questioning of Pentagon and Central Intelligence officials did not cast much new light on the accuracy of the Russian claim to have successfully tested an ICBM or as to which nation is ahead in the race for the missile. But he noted that past Soviet claims of achieving the atomic and hydrogen bombs have proved accurate, and "it would be very hazardous for the United States to dismiss the ICBM claim as propaganda."

"It would be a disastrous blow to our own people and our Allies should the Soviets

Army Secretary Wilber M. Brucker says Jupiter Missile is a "spectacular success." Page A8

win this race," he commented, "because it would represent the first time the United States has failed to win a race involving an important weapons system."

Jackson said Pentagon officials would not admit that economy was the cause of the cut in future production schedules of the missiles, but said their testimony "made it clear" that this is so.

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Brucker Calls Jupiter 'Spectacular Success'

By Ben Funk

MIAMI BEACH, Fla., Aug. 29.—Secretary of the Army Wilbur E. Brucker said today the U. S. Army's 1500-mile Jupiter missile is "a spectacular success."

At the same time, he expressed doubt in a press conference that Russia actually has an intercontinental ballistic missile which could be put to immediate use.

Brucker, here to address the convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, declined comment on how soon the U. S. expects to complete an ocean-spanning missile. He would say only that the Jupiter is "slightly ahead of schedule" and a "spectacular success."

Won't Identify Missile

Brucker would not say whether the missile test fired Wednesday at Cape Canaveral, Fla., was the Jupiter. But he added, "I'm not frowning about what occurred."

The missile was believed to have been either the Jupiter or the Thor. Both are intermediate range rockets.

The Army Secretary said the Soviet announcement indicated that the missile of which the Russians boasted was a "research test vehicle."

It's a long way, he added, from that to "an operational vehicle." This Nation must not be complacent about it, however, he said, adding:

"The important thing is to do all we can through our intelligence agencies to check out the Russian announcement, while going ahead calmly and swiftly with our own missile program."

Suspicious Factors Cited

Brucker said there were several suspicious factors in the Russian claim.

"The first," he said, "is the fact that the announcement was not made by Khrushchev or any other Soviet leader but in a vague, mysterious way by a political agency."

"The second was its extreme vagueness. There was none of the precise information which would be expected in an announcement of this kind."

"The third was its timing. It was announced at the very moment of the London Disarmament conference. It was intended to throw dismay into that conference and a fear hysteria into the Western World, particularly the United States."

In his speech to the VFW, Brucker said it would be disastrous for the United States to base its planning on the hope Russia might crumble from within.

"The Soviet leadership must deal with strong internal pressures which have become manifest in recent months," Brucker said.

"However, it would be disastrous if we shaped our course in the wishful belief that these pressures may soon result in the fatal disruption of the Soviet system."

Brucker warned the Veterans:

"The Communist goal of world domination has been too bluntly stated, and too often reiterated by the present masters of the Communist conspiracy, for any of us to retain illusions about the reality of our danger."

Brucker said the Army's missile arsenal "contains more than 10 different operational missiles tailored to specific requirements." Adding:

"They vary in size and power from the mighty Redstone, which can carry a nuclear warhead deep into an enemy's territory, to the relatively tiny Dart, which is able to destroy the heaviest tank."

Brucker said the Army can now fight effectively with either atomic or non-atomic weapons.

"That 'one-two' punch would be equally essential to victory in any war we might have to fight," he said.

Tass Accuses U.S. Press Of 'Hysteria' on Missile

From News Dispatches

The Soviet news agency, Tass, said in Moscow yesterday that the United States press was using Russia's claim of having developed an intercontinental ballistic missile to frighten the public into "war hysteria" and an arms race.

Tass also said that the Russian missile announced Monday had overthrown all calculations by Western powers toward use of a policy of "threats" based on atomic strategy.

Tass, which has asserted the missile could land "any place in the world," said the American press had remained silent about the section of the missile announcement in which the Soviet Union professed a

general disarmament agreement.

All major Russian newspapers continued to print carefully selected reaction from abroad to the Soviet announcement. ①

In Tokyo, Japanese meteorologists said they had reason to believe that a nuclear explosion in Russia Aug. 22 was caused by a missile-borne device.

Kyoto University's meteorological laboratory said the evidence, although not conclusive, pointed to the possibility that a missile carrying an atomic warhead had been tested.

In London, meantime the Ministry of Supply announced that Britain would make a new series of nuclear weapons test at Maralinga Proving Grounds in Australia next month.

It was also disclosed that a test site for Britain's intercontinental ballistic missile was being constructed near Hatfield, Hertfordshire, at De Havilland headquarters.

② Soviet affairs experts here said it was highly likely the Russians fired their intercontinental missile from the Vladivostok area.

The Soviets closed the Bay of Vladivostok, north of Japan, to foreign shipping last month and forbade foreign planes to fly over it.

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